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SECTION 1983 LITIGATION
Hon. George C. Pratt:
The first speaker will be Professor Martin Schwartz. Professor
Schwartz is the author of the leading, most authoritative treatise in
this area. If you are practicing in this area and you do not have a
copy of his treatise on section 19832 litigation, you are working
with one hand tied behind your back. He has done, and continues
to do, endless research in this area. He has spoken at this program
each time it has been given. He speaks in other places. He is a
consultant to practicing attorneys. And you will find that he really
knows what he is talking about.
* Professor Schwartz is highly accomplished in the field of § 1983
litigation and, among other things, co-authors, with John E. Kirklin, a leading
treatise entitled Section 1983 Litigation: Claims, Defenses, and Fees (2d ed.
1991 & Supp. 1 1995). Additionally, Professor Schwartz is the author of a
monthly column in the New York Lmv Journal, "Public Interest Law." Professor
Schwartz has also been the co-chair of the Practicing Law Institute Program on
§ 1983 litigation for over ten years. The author expresses grateful appreciation
for the valuable assistance of Lisa S. Levinson in the preparation of this article.
1. MARTIN A. SCmvARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983: CLAIMS,
DEFENSES AND FEES (2d ed. 1991 & Supp. 11994).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). This section provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall
be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id.
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Professor Martin A. Schwartz*:
INTRODUCTION
Well, as Judge Pratt mentioned, there were a number of
decisions rendered by the Supreme Court last Term dealing with
section 1983 litigation.3
In my opinion, the two most important of those decisions dealt
with the litigation of malicious prosecution claims brought under
section 1983,4 and with prisoners' rights claims that are litigated
under the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard. 5
Somewhat significantly, I think, both of those decisions were in
favor of section 1983 defendants. I will concentrate my remarks on
those two cases.
There are two other cases that I will talk about in a more
abbreviated form. One dealt with attempts by prisoners to attack
the constitutionality of their convictions or sentences under section
1983.6 The other dealt with qualified immunity.7
I. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION - ALBRIGHT V OLIVER
Now, to start with the malicious prosecution issue. In Albright v.
Oliver,8 the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a claim of
malicious prosecution may be asserted under section 1983 on a
substantive due process theory.9 This is an issue that has created
great difficulty in the circuit courts; the circuit courts around the
3. Some of the decisions involving § 1983 decided during the 1994 Term
include: Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994); Livadas v. Bradshaw, 114
S. Ct. 2068 (1994); Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994); Elder v.
Holloway, 114 S. Ct. 1019 (1994); Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994).
4. Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994).
5. Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994).
6. Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994).
7. Elder v. Holloway, 114 S. Ct. 1019 (1994).
8. 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994).
9. Id. at 810. The defendant claimed that the "action of the respondents
infringed his substantive due process right to be free of prosecution without
probable cause." Id. at 812.
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country have been struggling with this question for some time.
There have been several different positions in the circuits. For
example, the Second Circuit, 10 along with the Third Circuit, 11
ruled that the same elements of the common law tort of malicious
prosecution 12 also give rise to a constitutional claim under section
1983.13
In comparison, the First14 and Sixth1 5 Circuits ruled that
malicious prosecution may be litigated under section 1983 only
when the contested conduct is sufficiently egregious, whatever that
may be. The Ninth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff asserting a
malicious prosecution claim has to prove that the defendant acted
with an intent to violate the plaintiff's constitutionally protected
rights. 16 So, you have all of these different positions on the
question.
In the Albright case, Kevin Albright had been arrested and
charged in an Illinois state criminal proceeding with the sale of a
substance which appeared to be an illegal drug. 17 He was charged
10. See, e.g., Raysor v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1027 (1986); Singleton v. City of N.Y., 632 F.2d
185 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981).
11. See, e.g., Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1988).
12. At common law, the elements of a malicious prosecution action are:
"(1) A criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the
plaintiff. (2) Termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused. (3) Absence
of probable cause for the proceeding. (4) 'Malice,' or a primary purpose other
than that of bringing an offender to justice." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAWv OF TORTS § 119, at 871 (5th ed. 1984).
13. The Fifth Circuit, for the most part, has also held that the elements of
the common lav tort of malicious prosecution give rise to a constitutional claim
under section 1983. See, e.g., Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1992);
Wheeler v. Cosden Oil Chem. Co., 734 F.2d 254 (5th Cir. 1984). But see Beker
Phosphate Corp. v. Muirhead, 581 F.2d 1187 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the
claim must be sufficiently egregious).
14. See, e.g., Morales v. Ramirez, 906 F.2d 784 (1st Cir. 1990); Torres v.
Superintendent of Police, 893 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1990).
15. See, e.g., Coogan v. Wixom, 820 F.2d 170 (6th Cir. 1987); Vasquez v.
Hamtramck, 757 F.2d 771 (6th Cir. 1985); Dunn v. Tennessee, 697 F.2d 121
(6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1086 (1983).
16. Usher v. Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1987); Bretz v. Kelman,
773 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
17. Albright, 114 S. Ct. at 810.
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on the basis of testimony that was given at a preliminary hearing
by Detective Oliver. 18 The detective had testified that Kevin
Albright had sold the substance to a woman named Veda Moore,
who was an undercover informant. 19
As it turned out, Ms. Moore was pretty unreliable. That is putting
it mildly. The evidence showed that she actually made false
accusations in more than fifty other cases.2 0 Albright, after being
arrested and charged, posted a bond and he was released. 2 1
However, he was told that he could not leave the State of Illinois.22
I guess this is some type of punishment in and of itself. It turned
out that the substance that Albright sold was baking soda.2 3 The
state court judge eventually dismissed the criminal proceeding on
the ground that the facts alleged in the indictment did not add up to
a criminal offense under the Illinois Penal Code.24
So now, what is Mr. Albright to do? He did what any self-
respecting red-blooded American would do. He brought a suit in
federal court under section 1983.25 It was in the nature of
malicious prosecution. He brought it against Detective Oliver, who
had given the testimony at the preliminary hearing, and alleged a
violation of substantive due process. 26 He claimed that he had a
liberty interest to be free from criminal prosecution except upon
probable cause.2 7 He did not assert - this becomes important - a
procedural due process claim and he did not assert a Fourth
Amendment claim. It was solely a substantive due process claim.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 81 n.1.
20. Id. at 823 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens noted that:
[N]othing about [Ms. Moore's] performance in this case suggested any
improvement on her record. The substance she described as cocaine
turned out to be baking soda. She twice misidentified her alleged vendor
before, in response to a leading question, she agreed that petitioner might
be he; in fact, she had never had any contact with petitioner.
Id. at 823 (Stevens, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 810.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 810 n.l.
24. Id. at 810.
25. Id. at 810-11.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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Also note that he did not sue the prosecutor. There was good
reason for that. The prosecutor would have been absolutely
immune for the decision to prosecute and for any of the
prosecutorial activities at the preliminary hearing, 28 so he just sued
the detective.
The Supreme Court, in a seven-to-two vote, rejected Albright's
substantive due process claims, but the Court did so in six different
opinions, none of which commanded a majority.
The plurality opinion was written by the Chief Justice, and was
joined in by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Ginsburg. This is a
case where you have to count the votes of the Justices, so that is
four. Keep the number four in mind and we will see where we go
with that.
This plurality of four reiterated the present Court's normal
reluctance to expand the scope of substantive due process.2 9
Moreover, the plurality said that it is the criminal procedural
protections contained in the Bill of Rights that have been
incorporated against state government into the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment that were intended to provide
28. See Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991). In Burns, the Court held that a
prosecutor has absolute immunity for participating in the judicial phase of
criminal proceedings, such as probable cause hearings. Id. at 479. However,
absolute immunity is limited. The Court refused to extend such immunity to
prosecutors who give legal advice to the police. Id. at 480. The Court reasoned
that giving legal advice to the police was not "'intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process[.]"' Id. (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409,431 (1976)).
29. The plurality opinion stated that:
"As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the
concept of substantive due process because the guideposts for responsible
decision making in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended." The
protections of substantive due process have for the most part been
accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the
right to bodily integrity. Petitioner's claim to be free from prosecution
except on the basis of probable cause is markedly different from those
recognized in this group of cases.
Albright, 114 S. Ct. at 812 (citations omitted) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker
Heights, Tex., 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1068 (1992)).
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protections against arbitrary and abusive exercises of prosecutorial
power, rather than the more general notion of due process.30
It is on this basis, the plurality said, that where an individual has
been arrested, as Albright had been, he may claim protection only
under the Fourth Amendment. 3 1 The Fourth Amendment then
becomes, in the case of arrests, the sole source of constitutional
protection against challenges to pretrial deprivations of liberty.32
The plurality in the Albright case did something that was very
similar as to what the Court had done in its prior decision of
Graham v. Connor.33 There, in the excessive force arrest situation,
the Court had also ruled that the Fourth Amendment, in effect,
preempts any ability to rely upon substantive due process.34
Now, the notion that one constitutional provision somehow
provides the sole source of individual protection and, in effect,
preempts reliance upon other provisions of the Constitution, is a
somewhat new and, I think, unusual development. The Supreme
Court has normally recognized that the same official conduct may
give rise to allegations of constitutional violations under a number
of different provisions of the Federal Constitution.35 I think this
new, more restrictive approach which developed in Graham and
30. Id. at 813.
It was through... the Bill of Rights that their framers sought to restrict
the exercise of arbitrary authority by the Government in particular
situations. Where a particular amendment "provides an explicit textual
source of constitutional protection" against a particular sort of
government behavior, [the Fourteenth] "Amendment, not the more
generalized notion of 'substantive due process,' must be the guide for
analyzing these claims."
Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
34. Id. at 395. The Court reasoned that "[b]ecause the Fourth Amendment
provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this sort
of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more
generalized notion of 'substantive due process,' must be the guide for
analyzing" claims involving seizures. Id.
35. See Soldal v. County of Cook, 113 S. Ct. 538, 548 (1992) ("Certain
wrongs affect more than a single right and, accordingly, can implicate more than
one of the Constitution's commands.").
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continued in Aibright reflects the Court's displeasure with the
whole notion of substantive due process.
Having said that Mr. Albright might have a Fourth Amendment
claim, the Court then said, unfortunately for poor Mr. Albright,
that since he did not present a Fourth Amendment claim to the
Supreme Court, it would not decide the merits of such a claim.3 6
In fact, of the nine Justices on the Supreme Court, and remember
there were six different opinions, only Justice Ginsburg in a
separate concurring opinion chose to discuss the Fourth
Amendment issue.37 She articulated what you might think of as a
continuing seizure theory. Her theory is that once an individual has
been arrested, the seizure does not end at the point of arrest, but
continues throughout the criminal proceeding. 38
The reason she gave for that was, realistically, once a person has
been charged and arrested, that person remains under the control of
the state throughout the duration of the criminal prosecution.39 On
the basis of that theory, she would say that since there is a
continuing seizure, the police have an obligation to act reasonably
throughout the criminal prosecution. 40 It would mean, as she said,
that if an officer testified and gave false or misleading testimony
during the course of a criminal prosecution, he may be acting in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.4 1
It is an interesting theory, but no other Justice was willing to sign
onto it. Only Justice Ginsburg in the Albright case recognized this
continuing seizure theory.
Justice Souter wrote a separate concurrence. 42 He agreed with
the plurality that Mr. Albright did not have a substantive due
process claim.4 3 His only possible constitutional protection was
36. Albright, 114 S. Ct. at 813.
37. Id. at 814-17 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 815-16 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
39. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 816 ("This conception of a seizure and its course recognizes that
the vitality of the Fourth Amendment depends upon its constant observance by
police officers.") (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
41. Id (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 819-22 (Souter, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 819 (Souter, J., concurring).
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under the Fourth Amendment.44 The reasons given by Justice
Souter for that conclusion were a little different than the plurality's
analysis.
Justice Souter said that any damages that Albright may have
suffered would have stemmed from the arrest.45 This was another
way of saying that he did not see any independent damages
flowing to Albright from the charge, the decision to prosecute, as
opposed to the arrest. However, he left open the possibility that
there might be other cases, which he termed extraordinary cases, in
which the bringing of baseless criminal charges results in damages
that are independent of the damages brought about as the result of
the arrest. On that basis he attempted to disassociate himself from
the plurality. 4 6
However, his opinion expresses the same displeasure with
substantive due process that the plurality does. 47 He ultimately, in
the Albright case, came to the same conclusion as the plurality,
namely, that the Fourth Amendment was the sole possible basis for
Albright's claim.4 8 My view is that he is so closely aligned with
44. Id. at 821-22 (Souter, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 822 (Souter, J., concurring).
46. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 820 (Souter, J., concurring).
We are, nonetheless, required by '[t]he doctrine of judicial self-
restraint... to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break
new ground in [the] field' of substantive due process .... The
importance of recognizing [such] limitation is underscored by pragmatic
concerns about subjecting government actors to two (potentially
inconsistent) standards for the same conduct and needlessly imposing on
the trial courts the unenviable burden of reconciling well-established
jurisprudence under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments with the ill-
defined contours of some novel due process right.
This rule of reserving due process for otherwise homeless substantial
claims no doubt informs those decisions in which the Court has resisted
against relying on the Due Process Clause when doing so would have
duplicated protection that a more specific constitutional provision already
bestowed. This case calls for just such restraint, in presenting no
substantial burden on liberty beyond what the Fourth Amendment is
generally thought to redress already.
Id. at 820 (Souter, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting Collins v. Harker
Heights, Tex., 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1068 (1992)).
48. Id. at 822 (Souter, J., concurring).
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the plurality - I take him and I add him to the plurality of four, and
that in substance adds up to a majority of five. So, now we are up
to five.
Justice Kennedy authored a concurring opinion that was joined
in by Justice Thomas.49 As I see it, Justice Kennedy made a good
point and a bad point. He said, we agree that where an individual
challenges the constitutionality of an arrest, it is the Fourth
Amendment that provides the sole source of constitutional
protection;5 0 you cannot rely upon due process. Justice Kennedy
stressed, however, that Kevin Albright did not challenge his arrest,
he challenged the decision to charge him and to prosecute him, and
that in this situation the individual should be entitled to assert a due
process claim.51
Now, to me, Justice Kennedy makes a valid point, and it raises a
troublesome question about the approach taken by the plurality.
The plurality seems to be saying that because Kevin Albright was
arrested, he can challenge only the arrest and he can do so only
under the Fourth Amendment.
It would seem to me that Kevin Albright is entitled to say, look, I
have been arrested, but I choose not to challenge the arrest. My
challenge is to the filing of these baseless charges and the decision
to go ahead with the prosecution.
Having made what I think is a good and perceptive point, Justice
Kennedy should have stopped while he was ahead. Instead,
unfortunately, he went further and said that while Kevin Albright
was entitled to assert a due process claim against the filing of
baseless charges, his due process claim was defeated by the
doctrine of Parratt v. Taylor.52 Why? Because, he said, Illinois
provided an adequate state law remedy, namely, a state malicious
prosecution claim, a claim that could be asserted under Illinois
state law.53
Well, I think this is totally wrong. Parratt v. Taylor was a
doctrine that was intended to apply to procedural due process
49. Id. at 817-19 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 817 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 817-18 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
52. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
53. Albright, 114 S. Ct. at 819 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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claims, and even more narrowly, to a particular type of procedural
due process claim; a procedural due process claim growing out of
random and unauthorized official conduct. 54 I think that if one was
to accept Justice Kennedy's position that the Parratt v. Taylor
doctrine can apply to a claimed denial of substantive constitutional
rights, it would place in jeopardy the landmark ruling in Monroe v.
Pape55 that the section 1983 federal remedy was intended by
Congress to be independent of any available state remedies.
Only Justices Stevens and Blackmun, in their dissenting
opinions, were willing to recognize that the filing of baseless
criminal charges could work a deprivation of liberty and give rise
to a violation of substantive due process. 56
What is the overall picture here? I see the plurality and Justice
Souter rejecting the substantive due process claim because of the
existence of an alternative federal remedy, namely, the Fourth
Amendment claim. Justice Kennedy, concurring, rejected the
malicious prosecution claim because of the existence of an
alternative state law remedy.
Despite the fact that you have all these different positions among
the Justices, it is possible that there is an underlying theme, largely
unarticulated, that unifies the seven Justices who rejected Mr.
Albright's claim. The unarticulated thinking might be that because
the type of official wrongdoing that Albright is complaining about
is adequately covered under state law malicious prosecution
claims, there is not a sufficient reason to constitutionalize the claim
under the doctrine of substantive due process. 57
Let me make one other point. Technically we do not have a
majority opinion in this case, but already lower federal courts are
reading Albright as standing for the proposition that a substantive
54. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990). In Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982), the Court noted that "Parratt ... was dealing
with a. . . 'random and unauthorized act by a state employee .... "I Id. at 435-
36 (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981)).
55. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
56. Albright, 114 S. Ct. at 822-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986); Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327 (1986); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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due process malicious prosecution claim may not be asserted under
section 1983.58
II. ATTACKS ON CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES -
HECK V HUMPHREY
Malicious prosecution also played an important role in the
Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Hunphrey.59 In Heck, the
United States Supreme Court unanimously ruled that to recover
damages under section 1983 for an unconstitutional conviction or
sentence the plaintiff must show that the conviction or sentence has
been overturned on appeal, either in state court or in a state habeas
corpus proceeding or perhaps, by the governor.60
To put this issue in perspective, state prisoners who attack the
constitutionality of their convictions or sentences may seek relief
in a federal habeas corpus proceeding but, of course, only after
exhausting state remedies. 6 1 These claims literally come within
section 1983 because they are claims that state action is
unconstitutional. So there is a potential overlap between section
1983 and federal habeas corpus. Prisoners would almost always
rather bring a section 1983 action because the exhaustion
requirement for habeas corpus is not in section 1983. In addition,
there is the potential for recovery of attorney's fees under section
198862 in section 1983 actions. This is not true in federal habeas
proceedings.
58. See Perez-Ruiz v. Crespo-Guillen, 25 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 1994); Osborne
v. Howard, 844 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Ark. 1994); Cruz v. Stasinopoulos, 843 F.
Supp. 435 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
59. 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994).
60. Id. at 2372.
61. Id. at 2369.
62. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (b) (West Supp. 1994). Section 1988 provides in
relevant part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981,
1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985 and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-
318, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, or title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee
as part of the costs.
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In 1973, in Preiser v. Rodriguez,63 the Supreme Court attempted
to unravel this potential overlap of section 1983 and federal habeas
corpus. The Court ruled that where a prisoner attacks either the fact
or the duration of confinement and seeks either immediate or
quicker relief from confinement, federal habeas corpus is the
exclusive prisoner remedy. 64 Claims in which the prisoner seeks
immediate or quicker release come within the heart of federal
habeas corpus 65 and, in effect, the more specific federal habeas
remedy prevails over the more general section 1983 remedy. 66
This ruling prevents prisoners from trying to avoid the federal
habeas exhaustion requirement by simply putting a section 1983
label on the pleading. However, in Preiser, the Supreme Court did
not hold that prisoners may never sue under section 1983. They
can sue under section 1983, for example, to contest the conditions
of their confinement. 67 That would not be a claim for speedier or
immediate release. The Supreme Court in Preiser said, in
ambiguous dictum, that prisoners can seek damages under section
1983 because that would not be a claim seeking release either.68
So, predictively, these well-schooled prisoners, having read
Preiser v. Rodriguez, devised a strategy. What we will do, they
Id.
63. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
64. Id. at 488-89.
65. Id. at 487-89.
66. Id. at 489.
67. Id. at 500. The Court held, in Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249
(1971), that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "confers jurisdiction on the United States District
Courts to entertain a state prisoner's application for injunctive relief against
allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement." Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500.
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
68. The Court stated that:
If a state prisoner is seeking damages, he is attacking something other
than the fact or length of his confinement, and he is seeking something
other than immediate or more speedy release -- the traditional purpose of
habeas corpus. In the case of a damages claim, habeas corpus is not an
appropriate or available federal remedy. Accordingly, as petitioners
themselves concede, a damages action by a state prisoner could be
brought under the Civil Rights Act in federal court without any
requirement of prior exhaustion of state remedies.
Id. at 494.
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said, is to claim under section 1983 that the conviction or sentence
is unconstitutional. We will not ask for release, but simply ask for
money damages. Of course, if we get a holding that the conviction
or sentence is unconstitutional, we will then take that ruling to state
court and ask for release.
The lower federal courts, for twenty years, struggled with the
question of whether prisoners could assert claims that their
convictions or sentences were constitutional, under section 1983,
when they were seeking monetary relief.69 The lower federal
courts dealt with that issue as an exhaustion question. In other
words, whether the prisoner could file a section 1983 damages
claim even though state remedies had not been exhausted was the
question in the lower courts.
However, in Heck v. Humphrey, Justice Scalia, being the creative
Justice that he is, said that despite the many years of lower court
decisions, it is really not a question of exhaustion, but whether the
section 1983 claim is cognizable at all.70 That is the way he put it.
He reasoned this out through a series of steps. Section 1983 creates
a type of tort liability. 7 1 If you look to the closest common law tort
angogy to section 1983 suits attacking the constitutionality of a
conviction or sentence, it would be, he said, malicious
prosecution.72 One of the elements of common law malicious
prosecution is that the criminal proceeding must have terminated in
favor of the accused. 73 Justice Scalia said there was good reason
69. See generally Martin A. Schwartz, The Preiser Puzzle: Continued
Frustrating Conflict Between the Civil Rights and Habeas Corpus Remedies for
State Prisoners, 37 DEPAUL L. REv. 85 (1988).
70. Heck, 114 S. Ct. at 2370.
71. Id. at 2370. "'[T]he common law of torts has developed a set of rules to
implement the principle that a person should be compensated fairly for injuries
caused by the violation of his legal rights. These rules.., provide the
appropriate starting point for the inquiry under § 1983 as well."' Id. (quoting
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,257-58 (1978)).
72. Id. at 2371. The Court compared a false arrest claim, where a plaintiff
can recover damages for the time of detention to the time of arraignment only,
to a malicious prosecution claim, where "plaintiff may recover, in addition to
general damages, 'compensation for any arrest or imprisonment, including
damages for discomfort or injury to his health, or loss of time and deprivation of
the society."' Id. (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, § 119, at 887-88).
73. Heck, 114 S. Ct. at 2371.
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for that requirement; it prevents collateral attacks in civil actions
on the validity of convictions and sentences. 74
So, Justice Scalia, in effect, imported that common law principle
into section 1983 actions. The result was that a claim by a prisoner
under section 1983 that the conviction or sentence is
unconstitutional cannot be asserted until there is a showing that the
conviction or sentence has been overturned, either by executive
clemency or in some state or federal court proceeding.7 5
Justice Scalia stressed that this principle only applies to those
claims that necessarily implicate the constitutionality of the
conviction or sentence. 76 If, for example, a convicted defendant
asserts a Fourth Amendment violation that may be susceptible to
harmless error analysis, well, that would not be a claim that
necessarily implicates the constitutionality of the conviction. 77
Keep in mind two other points. One is the fact that just because a
claim is cognizable under section 1983 does not mean the federal
court will reach the merits. There may be a number of non-merits,
reasons for not resolving the claim, such as, res judicata, variousimmunities, or some of the abstention doctrines. 7 8 All the Court
held in Heck v. Humphrey is that until the conviction or sentence
has been overturned, a claim cannot even be asserted under section
1983. 79
The second point is that implicit in the Court's decision is a
ruling with respect to accrual of a claim for purposes of the statute
of limitations. If it is true that the section 1983 claim cannot be
asserted until the conviction or sentence has been overturned, that
means that the statute of limitations does not start to run until that
point in time.80
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2372.
76. Id. ("[This] principle... applies to § 1983 damages actions that
necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or
confimement .... ).
77. Id. at 2373 n.7.
78. See generally Schwartz, supra note 69.
79. Heck, 114 S. Ct. at 2372.
80. Id. at 2373-74.
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If you put Albright and Heck together, it is interesting that in
Albright the Supreme Court essentially closed the door on section
1983 malicious prosecution claims, while in Heck v. Humphrey,
the Supreme Court invoked the common law doctrine of malicious
prosecution to close the door on a fairly sizable chunk of prisoner
section 1983 claims.
III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY -ELDER V HOLLOWAY
Let us move on. If one was limited to four words, the four most
important words in section 1983 litigation, they would be
"qualified immunity" and "deliberate indifference." The Supreme
Court last Term did decide a case dealing with qualified immunity,
although I think it is on a fairly minor point. Of course, the issue
on qualified immunity is whether the official violated clearly
established federal law.
In Elder v. Holloway,8 1 the Supreme Court reaffirmed that
qualified immunity is ordinarily - of course, it has never told us
what it means by ordinarily - a question of law for the district
court.82 When there is a right to appeal, qualified immunity is also
a question of law for the circuit court. 83
Here is the issue. I think it is a small point. In evaluating whether
the federal law was clearly established at the time of the incident in
question, the Supreme Court in Elder said that the circuit court can
consider all relevant federal precedents, not just those that were
considered by or cited to the district court judge.84 I think of it, in a
way, as a question of who is going to do the legal research. The
Ninth Circuit came up with a ruling that was really one of a kind. It
said if the precedent was not cited to the district court and the
district judge did not come up with it on his or her own, the circuit
court cannot consider the precedent. This seems a little foolish
81. 114 S. Ct. 1019 (1994).
82. Id. at 1023.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1021.
1995]
TOURO LAWREVIEW
because a court determining the qualified immunity defense should
be able to consider all relevant precedents. 85
That is what the Court held in Elder v. Holloway. So, that was
not an earth-shattering decision. It did not even make the first page
of the New York Times.
IV. FARMER V BRENNAN AND DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
The other decision, Farmer v. Brennan,86 was a major decision
on the meaning of the phrase deliberate indifference. The plaintiff
in the case, Dee Farmer, was a transsexual - I am going to refer to
Farmer as she; that is how she wants to be referred. There was a
commotion during the oral argument, how are we going to refer to
Dee Farmer? The government insisted that Farmer be referred to as
he. It made a big point of this.87 If Fanner wants to be she, I think
we can give her that.
She alleged in her section 1983 complaint that she had been
beaten and raped by another inmate.88 In Farmer, the Supreme
Court ruled that prison officials have an Eighth Amendment
obligation to protect inmates from beatings, assaults, and attacks
85. Id. at 1022. The purpose of qualified immunity is to protect public
officials "'from undue interference with their duties and from potentially
disabling threats of liability."' Id. at 1022 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 806 (1982)). The Supreme Court found that the Ninth Circuit's
decision did not assist this goal because "its operation is unpredictable in
advance of the district court's adjudication. Nor does the rule further the
interests on the other side of the balance: deterring public officials' unlawful
actions and compensating victims of such conduct." Id. at 1022-23. The
Supreme Court found that "[i]nstead, it simply releases defendants because of
shortages in counsels' or the court's legal research or briefing." Id. at 1023.
86. 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994).
87. See 62 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1994).
88. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1975. The complaint alleged that she was placed
in this particular penitentiary or "in its general population despite knowledge
that the penitentiary had a violent environment and a history of inmate assaults,
and despite knowledge that [she], as a transsexual who 'projects feminine
characteristics,' would be particularly vulnerable to sexual attack ... ." Id.
[Vol I11
SECTION 1983
by other inmates, and may be held liable if found to be deliberately
indifferent with respect to this constitutional obligation.8 9
However, in writing the opinion, Justice Souter said that even
though the Court has employed a deliberate indifference standard
in prison condition cases since the 1976 decision in Estelle v.
Gamble90 - guess what - we realize that we never "paused," that
was Justice Souter's phrase, to define the meaning of deliberate
indifference. 91 I have two words for the Court: for shame!
The lower courts also have been using the deliberate indifference
standard for all these years and the Court cannot be bothered to tell
us what this phrase means. It cannot because its meaning is
obvious. If you think about it, it is questionable whether, literally, a
person can be deliberate and indifferent at the same time. The
Seventh Circuit described deliberate indifference as a "seeming
oxymoron."92
Now the Court in Farmer said that we have a case that requires
us to define the term and now we are going to define it. The
Supreme Court said it agreed with the position of the defendant
prison officials that deliberate indifference under the Eighth
Amendment requires a showing that the prison officials had actual
knowledge of the risk of harm to the prisoner. 93 You can break it
down into three elements, as the Court's decision does.94
. First, the prison official must be actually aware of the facts
which gave rise to the inference that there was substantial risk to
Farmer.95 Second, the prison official had to have actually drawn
the inference. It is not just that the official knew about the facts
89. Id at 1976-77.
90. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
91. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1977-78.
92. See McGill v. Duckvorth, 944 F.2d 344, 351 (7th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1265 (1992).
93. In Farmer, the Court stated that "deliberate indifference" lies
somewhere between negligence and "purpose or knowledge," and that
"deliberate indifference" can be equated with recklessness. "It is, indeed, fair to
say that acting or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk
of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that
risk." Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1978.
94. Id. at 1979.
95. Id
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creating the risk to Farmer, but also had to draw an inference from
those facts. 96 And third, despite having the information and
drawing the inference, the official disregarded the risk of danger.97
The Court in Farmer stated that the meaning of deliberate
indifference for Eighth Amendment purposes was not governed by
the decision that it had rendered in the case of City of Canton v.
Harris.98 In City of Canton, the Court had adopted the deliberate
indifference standard for municipal liability claims based upon
inadequate training. 99 In that context, the Supreme Court stated
that a municipality could be held liable for deliberately indifferent
training where the need for training was obvious.100 The need may
be so obvious that, objectively, new or different training should
have been provided. 10 1 That standard in City of Canton was
described in Farmer as being an objective obviousness test. 102
However, the Supreme Court in Farmer, said that in City of
Canton the Court was interpreting section 1983 itself.103 In
Farmer, the question was, how do we interpret the Eighth
Amendment?
So, what you wind up with, if you put Farmer together with City
of Canton, is two different definitions of deliberate indifference.
Nobody knew what it meant prior to Farmer. Now it has two
different meanings. One meaning exists for municipal liability
inadequate training claims where there is a type of objective
standard. 104 The standard is whether the policy maker knew or
96. Id
97. Id
98. 489 U.S. 378, 381 (1989) (action brought against city alleging violation
of detainee's due process rights to obtain "necessary medical attention while in
police custody"). In Farmer, the Court found that City of Canton dealt with an
interpretation of § 1983 and therefore did not govern this Eighth Amendment
issue. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1980-8 1.
99. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388-89.
100. Id. at 390.
101. Id.
102. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1981. "It would be hard to describe the Canton
understanding of deliberate indifference, permitting liability to be premised on
obviousness or constructive notice, as anything but objective." Id
103. Id at 1980-81.
104. City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378.
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should have known. 10 5 In the Farmer case, you are dealing with a
question of subjective knowledge on the part of the prison
officials. 106 And, I might add, that this may not be the end of the
story.
There is another, shall I say, realm of deliberate indifference
claims, those asserted by pretrial detainees. These claims are
asserted not under the Eighth Amendment; they are asserted under
the Due Process Clause. 107 Many are claims arising out of detainee
suicides in which inadequate medical treatment is alleged. 108 They
are litigated under a deliberate indifference standard also.
The question remains as to what deliberate indifference means
with respect to these due process claims? Now, if I had to guess, it
will probably mean the same thing that it means under the Eighth
Amendment. But we really do not have a definitive position. I
suppose it is possible that a different standard will be adopted for
these detainee claims, but I doubt it.
The last point I want to make, and Justice Souter stressed it in his
opinion in Farmer, is that whether a prison official had actual
knowledge of the risk of harm to the prisoner is a question of fact,
and it is a question of fact which should be decided by a jury from
all of the relevant evidence. 10 9
Interestingly, he said that the relevant evidence might include the
obviousness of the risk of harm to the prisoner,1 10 including for
example, where prison rape or prison assault is pervasive in a
particular prison.111 The jury may be able to infer from the
persuasiveness of the assaultive conduct that the prison official
actually knew about the risk of harm to Farmer. Not that the jury
105. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1981.
106. Id. at 1981. Therefore, "a prison official who was unaware of a
substantial risk of harm to an inmate [cannot] be held liable under the Eighth
Amendment if the risk was obvious and a reasonable prison official would have
noticed it." Id.
107. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
108. See, e.g., Colbum v. Upper Darby Township, 946 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir.
1991); Popham v. City of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561, 1563 (1 1th Cir. 1990);
Camps v. City of Warner Robins, 822 F. Supp. 724 (M.D. Ga. 1993).
109. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1981.
110. Id.
111. Id at 1981-82.
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must find such a fact, but the jury may find that the prison official
had that knowledge. 112
On the other hand, prison officials may be able to defend these
cases by showing either that they did not know about the facts that
created the substantial risk of harm for Farmer or, they knew about
those facts, and while maybe they should have drawn the inference
of a substantial risk of harm, they just did not. 1 13
The first is an ostrich defense. The second is the ignorance
defense. The third possibility is that the prison official knew about
the facts creating the risk of harm, drew the inference, and took
reasonable steps to prevent harm from occurring. The good guy
defense! 114
Thank you very much.
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
We will have a brief question period now which may deal with
the section 1983 cases. Are there any questions?
Hon. George C. Pratt:
I just want to comment on two things Marty mentioned in
discussing A/bright v. Oliver. This problem of the Fourth or the
Fourteenth Amendment really hinges on the Parratt v. Taylor
problem.
Now, Marty and I have never agreed on what Parratt v. Taylor
means or should mean. Parratt involved a $23.50 hobby kit that
came into the prison to be delivered to one of the prisoners. 115 And
when he came to get it, somehow it had disappeared. 116 To decide
whether there was a due process violation you have to first look to
see whether there was a deprivation of life, liberty, or property, and
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1982.
114. Id. at 1982-83. "Whether one puts it in terms of duty or deliberate
indifference, prison officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable under
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause." Id. at 1983.
115. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 529 (1981).
116. Id. at 530.
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then determine whether that deprivation came without due process
of law.
If you have the deprivation and the circumstances are such that a
pre-deprivation hearing is impractical, then a post-deprivation
hearing is all the state can provide. Obviously, you cannot have a
hearing before you "lose" something. It just does not make any
sense.
When the Supreme Court rendered the opinion, it said that a
post-deprivation hearing is the most anybody can do to help this
plaintiff.117 Therefore, if the state provides a post-deprivation
hearing, such as an action to collect damages for the loss of the
hobby kit, the deprivation that occurred is not without due
process. 118 It is a deprivation, true, but it is with due process, in the
sense that adequate corrective mechanisms are made available. 119
The implications of this for using the Due Process Clause are
enormous. You had some Supreme Court Justices saying, well, this
applies to property, but it does not apply to liberty. Eventually the
Supreme Court disagreed with that and said the clause applies to
deprivations of liberty and property. 120
What happened after that is that the Supreme Court had to shift
all of its false-arrest police type cases from a Fourteenth
Amendment due process to a Fourth Amendment search and
seizure analysis; otherwise, they would have thrown them out of
the civil rights litigation entirely because almost all of them occur
out in the field and represent random unauthorized conduct of
individual police officers rather than established state procedures.
The Court said you cannot have hearings out there on the
roadside to decide whether the police officer can club the driver
over the head with his billyclub; it just does not happen. But
suddenly the Court has moved out of the Fourteenth Amendment
into the Fourth Amendment and said, "Well, this is a question of
whether there was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth
Amendment." As a result, these cases were no longer affected by
the Parratt v. Taylor Fifth Amendment problem.
117. Id. at 538-41.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
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Now, translate this over into the malicious prosecution situation,
which has always presented problems of its own. If you think
about what somebody complains of when they raise a claim of
malicious prosecution, it really is not that they have been deprived
of something without due process, because the fact of the matter is
that to recover under malicious prosecution, they have to show
they were wrongfully charged and acquitted.
What they are really complaining about is they got too much
process. That is why these malicious prosecution cases have given
rise to all kinds of problems, and apparently, if Marty's
interpretation is correct, the majority of the justices are now
saying, "Well, you are not going to recover on any of this."
Another distinction was drawn by the Court in Zinermon v.
Burch.12 1 The Parratt doctrine applies to procedural due process,
but not to substantive due process claims. 12 2 1 frequently challenge
Marty to tell me what substantive due process really is, and once
you get beyond the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, it is
hard to say what it means. All this comes into focus, however, in
connection with a malicious prosecution claim. So I do not accept,
as readily as he does, the concept that it is simply wrong to say that
Parratt v. Taylor could not apply to a substantive due process
claim. That is one comment.
The other one is more in the nature of a question concerning the
deliberate indifference problem. Marty, the Court, if I understood
you, has said that deliberate indifference under the Eighth
Amendment is essentially both a subjective and an objective test as
to knowledge, but that you can find subjective knowledge as an
inference to be drawn from the obviousness of the situation. What
you are really looking at, then, is the objective side of it. The jury
can then look at that and say, well, obviously not only must the
jailers have known about this, but also, they did, in fact, know
about it.
I always understood the City of Canton test for municipal
liability to be an objective test that held that even constructive
knowledge is enough to establish liability. Now, almost everything
121. Id.
122. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 546-54 (Powell, J., concurring).
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else the Supreme Court has done in section 1983 cases has been to
get rid of juries. They have tried to create rules of law that can be
handled on summary judgment and on motions to dismiss, simply
because they want to avoid jury trials in these cases as much as
possible. 12 3 So we have a Court that has been saying, "We
have too many jury trials in these cases; we have got to find ways
of dealings with these problems in a non-jury way." My question,
then, is: Did they really, in Farmer, say we are going to give this
issue to the jury to determine whether or not it is sufficiently
obvious?
123. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991); Town of Newton v.
Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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